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Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases
Edward T. Haggins*
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law...
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
of the proceedings against him.1
T HESE WORDS, written in 1932 by Mr. Justice Sutherland for
the majority in the famous case of Powell v. Alabama2
underline the fundamental right of a defendant in American
criminal proceeding to have the assistance of counsel.
The right to counsel in the federal system is predicated on
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provides: 3
In all criminal prosecutions the accused should enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.
In a comment interpreting this Sixth Amendment right,
Edwin S. Corwin, the great constitutional law writer, noted that
the assistance of counsel includes such assistance while pre-
paring a defense, as well as during the trial. 4
The right to counsel was noted as early as 1769 by Black-
stone in his First Edition, where he stated:
Upon what fact of reason can that assistance be denied to
save the life of a man, which yet is allowed him in prose-
cutions for every petty trespass.
*B.S. in Business Administration, West Virginia State College; Internal
Revenue Officer, Internal Revenue Service; Fourth-year student at Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
I Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
2 Id. at 69.
3 Const. U. S., Amend. VI.
4 Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today, 177 (University
Press, Princeton, N. J., 1947).
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England originally denied the aid of counsel to one charged
with a felony, and it was not until 1836 that Parliament granted
the right to counsel in felony cases.
In 1701 Pennsylvania declared that all criminals shall have
the same privileges of witnesses and counsel as their prosecutors.
Maryland, before the adoption of the Federal Constitution, de-
clared that in all criminal prosecutions, every man . . . "hath a
right to be allowed counsel." In twelve of the original thirteen
colonies, some provision was made for the right to counsel. 5
The Supreme Court Recognizes the Right to Counsel
In Powell v. Alabama, the accused were tried in three
groups, and all three trials were completed in one day. Each
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to the death penalty.
The defendants were young, ignorant, and illiterate, and were
residents of states other than Alabama. Although the crime
charged carried the death penalty, no lawyer had been ap-
pointed to represent the defendants until the morning of the
trial. The Supreme Court, in reversing the convictions, stated
that in a capital case where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable of preparing his own defense, it is the
duty of the court to assign counsel.6
The Powell case sets out that the right to counsel is a fun-
damental one which cannot be denied an accused in a capital
case. Such counsel must be provided at a sufficiently early stage
in the proceedings to permit adequate preparation. The case
stopped short of holding, however, that the Sixth Amendment
was necessarily incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,
and therefore binding as such on the states.'
Ten years later another landmark case on the right to coun-
sel appeared in Betts v. Brady.8 The accused, Betts, was in-
dicted for robbery. Due to lack of funds, he was unable to se-
cure counsel. He requested that the court appoint counsel, but
the judge advised him that Carroll County, Maryland, had no
provisions for appointing counsel, except to represent indigent
defendants charged with murder and rape. He then proceeded
to represent himself at the trial, but was found guilty, and sen-
5 Powell v. Alabama, supra n. 1.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/16
15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
tenced to eight years in prison.9 Mr. Justice Roberts, in deliver-
ing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, stated:
The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies
only to trials in federal courts.10 The due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such,
the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment,'
although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifi-
cally embodied in that and others of the first eight amend-
ments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with
other elements, operated in a given case, to deprive a liti-
gant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.
1 2
The Betts case provided the background for the historic case of
Gideon v. Wainwright.13
Right to Counsel Held Mandatory in All Felony Cases
The Gideon case was reviewed by the Supreme Court under
unique circumstances. Earl Gideon was arrested and charged
with breaking and entering a Florida pool room with the intent
to commit a misdemeanor. Under Florida law, this offense is
classified as a felony. Since Gideon was without funds to em-
ploy counsel, he asked the court to appoint one on his behalf.
His request was denied by the court on the grounds that under
Florida law, counsel could only be appointed in capital cases.' 4
Like Betts, Gideon conducted his own defense, but was
found guilty and sentenced to serve five years in prison. While
in prison, Gideon filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Florida
Supreme Court. He alleged that since he was refused counsel,
his rights under the United States Constitution had been denied.
However the Florida court denied his petition without an opin-
9 Ibid.
10 The court cites the following cases as authority: Spies v. Illinois, 123
U. S. 131 (1887); In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888); Brooks v. Missouri,
124 U. S. 394 (1888); Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U. S. 31 (1890);
West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904); Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164
(1906).
11 The court cites the following cases as authority: Hurtado v. California,
110 U. S. 516 (1884); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900); West v. Louisi-
ana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S.
97 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
12 The court cites the following cases as authority: Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78 (1908); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
13 372 U. S. 335 (1963).
14 Ibid.
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ion. Gideon then sent a handwritten petition asking for cer-
tiorari, and a motion to proceed in "forma pauperis" to the
United States Supreme Court.
On June 4, 1962, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
appointed Abe Fortas to represent Gideon. In granting the
petition for certiorari, the court took an unusual step; it re-
quested that counsel for both sides discuss in their briefs and
oral arguments this question: "Should this court's holding in
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, be reconsidered?" 1"
In the majority opinion Mr. Justice Black stated that the
right to counsel is deemed fundamental to a fair trial in our
country. Our laws from the very beginning have placed great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards, which were
designed to guarantee fair trials, where all defendants stand
equal in the eyes of the law.'6
Two vital issues were laid to rest in Gideon. One was that
the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel was incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and became
binding on the States. This view was expressed by Mr. Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion. The second issue decided in this
case, and discussed by Mr. Justice Clark in his concurring opin-
ion, is that in capital and non-capital felony offenses alike, the
right to counsel exists.
It is interesting to note that while twenty-two states filed
amici curiae briefs in Gideon asking that Betts v. Brady be over-
ruled, only two filed such briefs urging affirmance. 17
At What Stage of the Proceedings Does the Right
to Counsel Occur?
Thus far the right to counsel as interpreted by the U. S.
Supreme Court has been traced from Powell (1932)18 to Gideon
(1963).19 This brief history serves as an introduction to Esco-
bedo v. Illinois,20 another landmark case on the right to counsel.
15 Ibid.
16 Id. at 344.
17 Id. at 335, 336; Krash, The Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 39 Notre Dame Lawyer 150 (1964). This is an ex-
cellent article, written by Abe Krash who, as a colleague of Abe Fortas,
assisted in preparing the brief in Gideon.
18 Powell v. Alabama, supra n. 1.
19 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra n. 13.
20 378 U. S. 478 (1964). See Milledge, Escobedo-Toward Eliminating
Coerced Confessions, 19 U. Miami L. R. 415 (1965).
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The facts in Escobedo were these: The accused, a youth
of Mexican extraction, and his sister were arrested. They
were taken to police headquarters in Chicago to be questioned
in connection with the fatal shooting of Escobedo's brother-in-
law. While detained at the police station, the accused made sev-
eral requests for counsel, which were denied. Counsel, who had
been retained by the family of the accused, was refused permis-
sion to see his client by the police who advised him that they
were questioning Escobedo. Although the attorney spotted Esco-
bedo through an open door, and made every possible effort to
consult with him, he was denied this right. In the interim, police
continued to question Escobedo about the murder, using various
ruses to persuade him to confess. Eventually, he made a dam-
aging statement to an Assistant State's Attorney, which was
later admitted at the trial. Although he made a timely motion
to suppress the statement, it was admitted into evidence.21
Before discussing the opinion of the court in Escobedo, the
right to counsel should be examined in terms of time. When
does this right arise in the accused? The Sixth Amendment is
silent with reference to this question.
It is abundantly clear from a line of cases climaxed by
Gideon, that an accused is entitled to counsel in all felony cases,
capital, and non-capital.2 2 At what point between arrest and
trial the accused may exercise the constitutional right to counsel
must now be determined.
The "denial of counsel" question usually arises when the
accused has made a confession prior to consulting with counsel,
and this confession is subsequently used at the trial as evi-
dence. 23 If the confession was obtained from the accused by
physical or mental coercion, there is no doubt that the accused's
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment have
been violated.24
Unfortunately there is no dividing line to determine whether
a confession is coerced, or is made voluntarily. 25 By the same
21 Ibid.
22 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra n. 13.
23 Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5 Vand.
L. Rev. 507 (1952); McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943).
24 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547
(1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
25 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948). A 15-year old boy was questioned
by relays of police from midnight until 5:00 A. M. without benefit of coun-
(Continued on next page)
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token there is no neat line to determine when counsel should
be appointed or should be granted permission to see the accused
after his arrest.
Timing is of crucial importance in the appointment of
counsel. It is often stated that the failure to appoint counsel
in time presents one of the gravest problems in the right to
counsel cases. 26 In Ex parte Sullivan,27 two boys, with no prior
criminal records, repeatedly asked for counsel after their arrest,
but were told by the police if they had no money to procure
counsel, none would be provided. The police then tricked the
boys into making a written confession and counsel was not ap-
pointed for the accused until after they had been arraigned and
had pleaded guilty. The court, in holding that the boys had been
denied due process, stated:
One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: "Let them
have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can't escape
the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them
at the trial."
It has been held that absence of counsel at a preliminary
hearing, where the accused pleads guilty without the advice of
counsel violates Due Process.28 In so holding, the court cited
Hamilton v. Alabama as a basis for its decision. 29 In that case
the accused was arraigned without counsel for a capital offense
committed in the State of Alabama. In Alabama, arraignment
is an extremely critical time in the proceeding, for only then
may certain defenses and pleas be raised. The accused was found
guilty and sentenced to death. The court held that the absence
of counsel for the accused at his arraignment violated his con-
stitutional rights, and reversed the sentence. The "critical"
stage of the prosecution was cited by the court in making its
(Continued from preceding page)
sel or friend to advise him. The Supreme Court ruled that his confession
was obtained in such a manner as to violate Due Process under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
26 Krash, op. cit. supra n. 17; the author of this article states:
I believe that the right to an attorney should attach at the time of ar-
rest. That is the moment when the State assumes an adversary role. It
is also the time when an accused may be most in need of legal assist-
ance.
27 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. C. Utah 1952).
28 White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963).
29 368 U. S. 52 (1961).
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determination that the accused should have been represented by
counsel.30
In Crooker v. California,3 1 the court held that the accused
had not been denied Due Process by being refused counsel. The
defendant, a college graduate who had attended law school, was
refused counsel several times between his arrest and his confes-
sion. Although he was denied counsel, he was advised of his
right to remain silent. It is apparent that the court felt that in
these circumstances the accused was fully aware of his right to
stand mute and therefore considered the confession voluntary.
In Cicenia v. Lagay32 the petitioner argued that although
he had engaged counsel before his arrest, he was repeatedly de-
nied the right to confer with his retained counsel until he con-
fessed. The court held that the refusal to permit the accused to
consult with counsel while being examined by the police did not
violate his constitutional rights.
In Stroble v. California33 the contention of the accused was
that he had been deprived of Due Process in that he was denied
the aid of counsel when he waived trial by jury on the issue of
insanity. The court decided that in view of the fact that the
Public Defender himself had advised the accused to waive trial
by jury on the insanity issue, there was no violation of Due
Process.
In 1961 in Culombe v. Connecticut,3 4 the Supreme Court
decided that Arthur Culombe, a 33-year old mental defective of
the moron class had been deprived of Due Process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision was based on the
fact that the accused was taken into custody and held without
benefit of counsel although he requested such constantly. He
was questioned for five days without arraignment and benefit of
counsel and ultimately confessed to participating in a hold up
in which two men were murdered.
The accused in Spano v. New York, 35 a foreign-born young
man with a limited education and with no previous criminal
record, after being indicted for first-degree murder, surrendered
30 Id. at 52.
31 357 U. S. 433 (1958).
32 357 U. S. 504 (1958).
33 343 U. S. 181 (1952); also see: Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U. S. 426 (1958).
34 367 U. S. 568 (1960); also see: Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 (1957).
35 360 U. S. 315 (1959).
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to police. Eight or more hours of questioning led to his confes-
sion. During the questioning he continuously requested and was
denied counsel. The Supreme Court held that his confession ad-
mitted into evidence violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
36
Approximately one month before Escobedo, in Massiah v.
United States,37 the Supreme Court decided that incriminating
statements obtained by federal agents from an accused, in the
absence of his attorney, deprived the accused of his right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In this case, federal agents
had installed a radio transmitter in the automobile of an alleged
confederate, and thereby overheard damaging statements by the
accused.
The most recent decision in the right to counsel cases, Esco-
bedo v. Illinois,38 should be examined in the light of the forego-
ing evolution.
Arrest to Arraignment: the Critical Stage
The majority opinion of the court in the Escobedo case was
written by Mr. Justice Goldberg. In it he stated that the many
arguments against the right to counsel before indictment are
made, because "any lawyer worth his salt" will tell his client
emphatically not to make any statement to the police. This will
cause confessions to decrease considerably.39 And justice will
thereby be restricted, or so goes the argument.
This argument, of course, is double edged. The fact that
many confessions are obtained during this period, points up its
critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice" is clearly
needed.40 The opinion contained a pronouncement that should
have a far reaching effect on future criminal cases. It stated
that when the investigation has started to focus on a particular
suspect, and is no longer a general inquiry as to an unsolved
crime, and the police have not warned the suspect of his con-
stitutional right to remain silent, or his corresponding right to
36 Ibid.
37 377 U. S. 201 (1964).
38 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra n. 20.
39 Id at 488; the court also cites: Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
40 Ibid: also see; Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder J. Rundle, 198 A. 2d
565 (Pa. 1964); State v. Kirkland, 197 A. 2d 876 (N. J. Super., 1964); State
v. Guay, 196 A. 2d 599 (Conn. Super. 1963).
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counsel, any statement of confession obtained during such inter-
rogation, may not later be used at the trial against the accused.4 1
As a result of the holding in Escobedo, the accused must
now be allowed to consult with counsel when the interrogation
reaches the accusatory stage. However several questions remain
unanswered by this case, such as: Does this decision require the
police to warn the accused of his right to counsel, or his right to
remain silent if he has no counsel? May the accused waive his
right to counsel? And finally, will the court require that coun-
sel be appointed in all criminal cases; misdemeanors as well as
felonies? We can only guess as to the answers, as only one of
these questions has been answered by a previous case. In
Crooker the accused, a former law student, was advised of his
right to remain silent and the court held that he was not de-
prived of Due Process.42 It is felt that in future cases the Su-
preme Court will find a violation of Due Process based on the
denial of counsel, unless the accused is timely warned of his con-
stitutional rights and every step is taken to see that these rights
are not abridged. 4
3
Conclusion
Although the cry rings through the country that the Su-
preme Court is coddling criminals by its recent decisions, such
a charge is unconvincing. In our system of justice, a man is pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty. Until he is actually found
guilty by a jury of his peers, every effort must be made to safe-
guard his rights.
Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School recently com-
mented, in remarks made to the Cleveland Bar Association: 44
the court has simply decided that the time has come to en-
force the high standards that we have long professed. To be
sure this makes life harder for law enforcement agencies.
41 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra n. 20; also see: note, Right to Counsel During
Police Interrogation, 16 Rutgers L. R. 16 (1962); and Justice Tom C. Clark,
The Sixth Amendment and the Law of the Land, 8 St. Louis U. L. J. 1(1963); also, Simlone and Richardson, The Indigent and His Right to Legal
Assistance in Criminal Cases, 8 St. Louis U. L. J. 15 (1963). These discuss
"critical stage."
42 Crooker v. California, supra n. 31.
43 See: Note, Police Power to Stop, Frisk and Question Suspicious Persons,
65 Columbia L. R. 848 (1965); also see: Weisberg, Police Interrogation of
Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 21, 39 (1961).
44 "The Supreme Court," Time Mag. (May 21, 1965) p. 63.
Jan., 1966
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But we must do more to help and upgrade the police. They
should have more instruction on their duties than is now
available to them.
Only when the States fully meet their responsibilities in in-
suring criminal justice to all citizens through the right to coun-
sel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and embodied in the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, will we ap-
proach realization of the great potential of our system of criminal
law.
45
45 Ibid.
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